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Constitutional Reflections of the People:
Representation in the Constitutions of the United States (1789) and Chile (1833)

The consensus among historians – historians of constitutions, Latin American history,
Chilean history, and revolutionary history – has been that Latin American constitutions have
copied the institutions, language, ideas and republicanism embodied in the American Constitution
of 1789. Renowned American historian of Chile, Simon Collier, once said, “When it came down
to constitutional arrangements, the Chileans did not depart radically (or indeed at all) from the
traditional framework laid down by the United States Constitution,”.1 Considering the scholarship
surrounding Latin American constitution-making post-independence, this paper is a comparative
analysis of the constitution-making processes regarding issues of representation in the American
Constitution of 1789 and the Chilean Constitution of 1833.
In comparing the historical development and drafting of Constitutions in newly
independent American nations, this paper seeks to understand the similarities between American
and Chilean constitutional considerations of representation and underlying political theory from a
historical perspective so as to explain each country’s unique experiences and Constitution as a
reflection of national identity. Bearing the purpose in mind, the following research question will
be discussed:
RQ: “In what ways do Chile and the United States’ respective Declarations of
Independence, political thought surrounding representation in government, and
constitutional documents discuss the rights of representation?”
While Simon Collier and other historians argue that the institutions, structure and language
of the Chilean Constitution is similar, or in some places the same, as the American Constitution of
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1789, each nation held similar values while forming their constitution with respect to the issue of
representation with similar concerns, but in distinct ways and for differing reasons. While
similarities exist between the American and Chilean Constitutions and their approach to
representation, it is reductionist to argue that the Chilean Constitution was a replica of the
American Constitution when both were formulated in unique historical and intellectual contexts.
Historiography:
According to Justin Collings, a comparative legal scholar of Brigham Young University,
“the most striking aspect of current constitutional historiography is its scarcity,”.2 Constitutional
comparative studies are limited both in terms of volume and geography i.e. current constitutional
historiography is largely limited to North America, Europe, Japan, and little elsewhere. In the last
twenty years the scholarship surrounding constitutional history has been expanded to include more
about Latin American Constitutions and their development. In Chile, comparative constitutional
literature has examined the Constitutional portrayal of the executive as well as of the judiciary.3
This paper will be situated in the scarce historiographical setting of comparative constitutional
history so as to pave the way for more Latin American, and specifically Chilean, constitutional
comparison to enter the scene and expand the limited literature available. As well as giving the
case of Chile a spot in the historiographic scope of constitutional comparison, this paper moves
away from the traditional, simplistic discourse of Latin American countries “importing” their
Constitutions post-independence, namely from the United States.4 This paper will use a relational
comparison, as Collings deems it, in looking at political thought surrounding the ideals of
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representation, independence era documents, and Constitutional documents to the chosen
Constitutions of study as the basis for comparative analysis. This paper, then, will add to the field
of constitutional comparative historiography by expanding on Chilean constitutional literature,
comparing the relation between Latin America and the United States via political thought and postindependence experiences in informing their notion of representation in their constitutions, and act
as a trailblazing example of relational constitutional comparison.
Sources and Methodology:
Considering the question posed in the paper, major political writings in Chile and the
United States surrounding the new constitutions are the primary sources being considered.
American political thought surrounding the Constitution is largely encapsulated in the writings of
figures like Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. Each of
those figures wrote letters, formal editorial pieces, speeches, and some took notes on the
Constitutional Convention debates.5 Simon Collier notes, however, that political theory was
indulged in for practical purposes in Chile between 1810 and 1833 (129) and that Chileans did not
produce seminal works like The Federalist No. 1-85 (130). Further, Collier argues that the Chilean
revolution produced no original political thought or theorist (131). Collier noted that most political
thought was encapsulated formally and informally in local newspaper editorials and in the writings
of a few key figures.6 Surrounding Chile’s Gran Convencion from 1831-1833 there are a plethora
of available documents online ranging from editorial political opinions in local newspapers,
convention summaries, and formalized constitutional proposals, like Mariano Egaña’s Voto
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Particular of 1832.7 In both Chilean and American writings, political thoughts and opinions
surrounding the rights of representation in each Constitution are included.
Chilean sources will be evaluated through a comparative lens against American sources. I
have compared Chilean sources, looking for similarities to American sources, because I am
familiar and comfortable with the English language and with the ideas encapsulated in those
writings. Secondary sources will affirm or clarify my readings of both Chilean and American
political theory and provide a more robust source set for debates. Between primary sources I am
looking for similarities, not to affirm the idea the Chilean Constitution was copied and pasted, but
to prove that each nation formulated their rights to representation in their constitutions for similar
reasons but in distinct ways. This type of analysis feeds directly into the historiography I’m trying
to contribute to and answer the question of what ways the Constitutions were a reflection of their
own nation’s political thoughts and experience.
Thematic Considerations:
What Constitutions Are
Constitutions, according to Denis J. Galligan and Mila Versteeg, establish a system of
government, either in written text or through a semi-codified system of common law. Constitutions
also define the powers and functions of institutions, provide limits on such institutions, and
regulate the relations between institutions and the people (6).8 Fundamentally, Constitutions
promulgate social institutions that interact with society at large in complex and varying ways (7).9
The Framers in every instance of The Federalist insisted that Constitutions act as means to define

See Observaciones a la Constitucion,” El Valdiviano no. 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, August, 15 1829; September, 21 1829;
December, 21 1829; January, 19 1830; and February, 11 1830., R.B.’s “A la Honorable Convencion,” El Mercurio
np. 137 and 138, December, 12 and 13 1831., and Mariano Egaña’s, Voto Particular. May 12, 1831 as some examples.
8
Denis J Galligan and Mila Versteedg. Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions. (New York, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2013).
9
Ibid.
7
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the powers of government, provide limits on such institutions, and to regulate the interactions
between government and the governed. Chileans held that Constitutions were of fundamental,
sacred importance to society (150).10 Andrés Bello, a lifelong intellectual figure in Latin America,
operating in Chile during the drafting of the 1833 Constitution, once said,
Constitutions are often the work of a few architects, who sometimes get it right and
sometimes not; not really because the work did not arise from the social base, but because
it lacks the qualities necessary to influence society gradually, and to receive its influences,
so that this reciprocal action, by modifying the two, brings them closer and harmonizes
them, 11
Constitutions, as social institutions, can be an expression of a country’s values and aspirations,
as well as statements of core values (73).12 The drafters of each of Chile and the United States’
Constitutions sought to bear their country’s core values in mind, and at times, they failed. The
Constitutions in question, America’s Constitution of 1789 and Chile’s Constitution of 1833, are
examples of each country getting it right, at least in terms of the people’s rights to
representation.
How Constitutions Handle People and the Idea of Representation
This essay focuses on the American and Chilean Constitutions of 1789 and 1833,
respectively, and how they regulate the relations between government and its people, with regard
to individual rights to representation. To legal scholars of modern constitutions, including the ones
in question, “the people” can make up to three appearances in the Constitution: a preamble by the
people, to provide for the election of representatives, and to vote on amendments or referendums
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(134).13 In general, Constitutions say little about the people, and the Constitutions at hand,
regarding representation, are no different. The only real authority left to the people is to elect
representatives, and sometimes the executive.14
American thinkers from the Declaration of Independence to the ratification of the
Constitution (1789) held that government had to derive their powers from the consent of the
governed, be it directly or indirectly. 15 In the Constitution, therefore, the Framers involved the
people by ensuring their right to engage in the political process by electing their officials. 16 Chile
ascribed to similar thoughts and demanded a government which was governed by the consent of
the people.17
The American Experience of Independence:
Colonial Grievances
By 1750, the American colonies were well established on a growing sense of national
identity and self-dependence, despite English governorships over the American peoples (315).18
Between 1756-1763, the American colonists were conscripted into the Seven Years’ War to fight
the British war in Canada. The American colonists felt deep grievances over the war in terms of
how it was managed and the economic despair it caused.
An anonymous author for the Boston Independent Advertiser wrote extensively about the
grievances felt by many of the colonists. To the author, men enlisted, often forcibly, and the
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economy suffered while men of a town’s population of enlisted men died.19 Another grievance
held by the colonists was that they were not protected at home by the British whom they fought
for. Further, during the war the British military was incompetent and indecisive, leading to the
disproportionate deaths of colonists in the war.20 The author left his readers with a bitter piece of
his truth,
It is impossible for any man who truly loves his country, to be unaffected with the present
melancholy situation of its affairs. To behold the fruits of our labors, toils and hazards,
given up at once to our proud insulting enemies! And ourselves, after all the brave attempts
we made, and the blessings of divine providence on our bravery, in a far worse condition
than when the war commenced!21
To the writer, the grievances of the war extended beyond seven years both back in time and into
the foreseeable future.
Americans, weary after seven years of fighting, destroyed colonial economies, and the loss
of thousands of young men, were disillusioned and uneasy about their future, specifically with
Britain. Britain, hemorrhaging economically after the war and trying to keep soldiers stationed in
the American colonies, imposed a number of tax acts. The tax acts of the 1760s were contentious
to say the least: the Sugar Act of 1764, the Quartering Act of 1765, the Townshend Acts of 1767
and the Tea Duties of 1768 created riots, boycotts and incited leaders of American politics to push
for independence via revolution (325-326).22 Riots and fighting continued for a decade with
varying, repressive responses from the British Crown. The Revolutionary War began officially on
April 18, 1775 as the British sent 1,000 soldiers to Boston to capture Samuel Adams and John
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Hancock to be met by resistance.23 The British and the Americans fought bloody battles across the
colonies from 1775-1783, until the Americans prevailed. It was in 1776, however, that the
Americans produced the Declaration of Independence.

The Declaration of Independence (1776)
The Declaration of Independence, according to Rett R. Ludwikowski and William F. Fox,
Jr. is a constitutional document.24 It is an important document to analyze with regard to the
development of the Constitution of 1789 because its promulgation provoked the creation of
constitutions post-independence and provided for much of the language that found its way into the
Constitution.25 Beyond the language, it was the ideas, formed from grievances as well as hopes for
the future, that found their ways into the Constitution and subsequent amendments like the Bill of
Rights. In 1776, following the outbreak of the revolutionary war, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams,
Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, and Robert Livingston, appointed by the interim Continental
Congress, drafted the Declaration of Independence.
Fundamentally, the authors of the Declaration claim that some rights are self-evident.
Rights such as happiness, liberty, property, all of which can only be protected by
“governments…instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed,”. The colonists sought to abolish the governance of Great Britain in favor of one which
advocated on behalf of the “public good” of Americans. In the Declaration, the authors outlined a
myriad of grievances posed by the King. Of the ones related to representation, there were several.
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For one, “He has refused to pass other Laws for the accommodation of large districts of people,
unless those people would relinquish the right of Representation in the Legislature, a right
inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only.” Another, “He has dissolved Representative
Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people.”
Finally, “He has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected;
whereby the Legislative powers, incapable of Annihilation, have returned to the People at large
for their exercise.” In all, the colonists believed that the King was tyrannical in refusing the
people’s rights to representation, to legislation on their behalf, and to a choice in their government.
Securing the fundamental rights of man meant that the governing must derive their just powers
from the consent of the governed. This idea of popular sovereignty was integral to achieving all
other rights and was requisite in the formation of the Constitution of 1789.
The Articles of Confederation:
American leaders knew that a union was essential after the Declaration of Independence
(1776). In 1777, the Second Continental Congress drafted the Articles which were finally ratified
in 1781 (8).26 The Articles of Confederation attempted to walk the fine line between giving too
much power to a new continental government, akin to Great Britain, and not nearly enough to do
anything meaningful. To most historians, the Articles of Confederation unfortunately suffered the
latter: being too weak to achieve anything meaningful.
The Articles of Confederation are often criticized for their flaws, of which, objectively,
there were many. The Articles of Confederation could not levy taxes, and therefore, could not raise
revenues to pay for the expenses of government. The Articles required the unanimous approval of
state legislatures for any amendments and failed to provide a chief executive necessary for unity
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and a functioning government (9).27 Beyond the failures of the law, the Articles of Confederation
also had practical problems: The Congress could rarely reach quorum to act and the provincial
interests overwhelmed the interests of the country. Additionally, there was a lack of institutional
knowledge due to the fact that term offices were limited to one year.28 Further, the Congress lacked
any enforcement measures as states were recognized as the supreme governing bodies. The
Articles of Confederation were originally designed to enable the 13 states to coordinate their war
efforts, which left political affairs hanging in the balance (11).29 In terms of representation, the
people had no say. Representatives to the national Congress were selected by state legislative
representatives.
After 3 years of dysfunctional government, America’s influential leaders sought change.
A small group gathered in Annapolis, Maryland on September 11, 1786 to discuss reform, but few
showed up and leaders like James Madison and Alexander Hamilton desired more (21).30 The
Convention began on May 14, 1787 and achieved quorum to start work on the 25th. It did not
address questions of representation until May 30th. At which time, the delegates embraced the ideas
of legislatures, just not how they would be formed or elected (106).31 Along with concerns for
forming the legislative branch, the delegates were concerned with how a legislature would
represent the diverse interests of the national citizenry. To James Madison, the solution was
proportional representation and a bicameral legislative branch. While states favored a bicameral
legislative branch, the delegates were conflicted on proportional representation, especially the
delegates from smaller states that feared larger states overwhelming their votes in both houses of
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the legislature. From May 25th to September 17th the Convention met to debate pressing issues
such as these. It wasn’t until 1789 that the Constitution was ratified. In the 2 years between drafting
the Constitution and ratifying it, a political debate ensued between Federalists and AntiFederalists. For the sake of this paper, since both parties generally agreed on representation, the
political thought concerning representation is focused on broadly, with acute analysis of prevailing
Federalist thought.

American Political Theories of Representation:
Americans generally agreed that legislatures, and bicameral legislatures at that, were both
necessary and expedient for good governance. Federalist thinker James Madison focused the
majority of his discussion in The Federalist Papers on the Legislative branch and then the
Executive branch. To accomplish the republican values of popular sovereignty, James Madison
outlined the ways in which members of the national government were elevated to their position by
the people. The Legislative branch was a bicameral institution with two different houses: The
House of Representatives and the Senate. The House was to be composed of directly elected
officials based on territorial, proportional representation. To Madison, the House was most
immediately dependent upon the people, or representative of them.32 The Senate, on the other
hand, was indirectly representative of the people. Senators were appointed by members of state
legislatures as a way to give States a hand in the formation of the federal government. 33 Madison
argued that the Senate was indirectly derived of the people because the people chose their State
representatives, which then chose their Senators who worked on behalf of their State’s and its
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people’s best interests. As for the executive, Madison argued that the people had an indirect say in
their President. The people of each state elected national representatives that then chose the
President. Madison’s thought was that the people would elect well-informed citizens to make
decisions in the interest of the people and the Union at large.34 The people, then, were responsible,
or semi-responsible, for the election of their representatives, but had no real say beyond their
perceived right to elect, either directly or indirectly.
James Madison chose a republic because fundamentally the government should be
accountable to the people. Madison chose a divided form of government to prevent a concentration
of powers in a singular body. To him, the division of powers and means of representation in the
federal government was essential to the protection of individual liberties and prevented tyrannical
practices.35 James Madison also chose a representative republic, as opposed to direct or pure
democracy, because it counteracted the ignorance and factionalism of the common people.
Madison recognized that his form of republicanism forced citizens to work through an
intermediate, chosen body who would then discern the best interests of the people. The voice of
the people, then, was siphoned through one individual or a body of individuals that believed they
knew what was best for the many and varying interests of their people.
James Madison was not the only American thinker to agree upon the values of accountable
governance, popular sovereignty, and the right to representation. Thomas Jefferson, a Founding
Father, and later President of the United States, writing from Paris to Madison argued that the form
of government for the American republic had to be one “wherein the will of every one has a just
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influence… and in our states, in a great one”.36 To Jefferson, a representative form of government
like the one proposed by Madison was the best way to ensure a just degree of liberty and happiness.
Ideas Ratified in the Constitution:
The Constitution ultimately encapsulated the ideas put forth by the Federalists during the
convention and defended in The Federalist Papers, among others. The Preamble of the
Constitution begins, “We the People of the United States,”. One of the areas in which the people
are considered is in the preamble of a Constitution. The American preamble, and the first words
of the Constitution, make clear that the people ordained the Constitution. It is a supreme governing
document by and for the people, instead of for the leaders. Fundamentally, American government
was to be accountable to the people in all its actions, which is then reflected in Articles pertaining
to representation. Article I, Section 1 states, “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”
Article I, Section 2 outlines the fact that the House of Representatives would be chosen by direct
popular vote. Article I, Section 3 states, “The Senate of the United States shall be composed of
two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof,”. Beyond the legislative branch,
the people are entitled to nothing more. Even electing the executive is out of their hands, “Each
State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors,
equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in
the Congress.” It is the state that has the authority to choose the President, not the people.
The Framers of the 1789 Constitution, considering their grievances against the British
Crown as well as the failures of the Continental Congress, created the Constitution to be
accountable to the people via representation, and to the states. The people would have the just
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degree of influence in choosing their House Representatives directly, and their Senators and
President indirectly. To the Framers, the people’s will was represented through both the preamble
and the Constitution.
The Chilean Experience of Independence:
The Proclamation of Independence (1818)
After eight years of bitter fighting in Chile, four revolutionary Chileans gathered to put an
official end to the war against Spain and the monarch’s loyalists operating out of Peru, and to
proclaim Chile’s independence from Spain.37 This section details the movement towards
independence, beginning in 1810, the ideas of independence enshrined in the Proclamation, as well
as ideas of representation pronounced by the Proclamation.
As most revolutions in Latin America began, Chile received word of Napoleon’s conquest
in Spain by May of 1808, and Charles IV’s subsequent abdication. Although Chilean Creole elites
were initially willing and desired to work with the monarchy, the Creoles had many grievances
against Spanish elites living in Chile and against the Spanish Crown (6, 15). 38 Creole grievances
mixed with the opportunity posed by Charles IV’s abdication became the impetus for the
movement for home rule, despite some loyalist Creoles hoping for the regeneration of the
monarchy. The Creoles, in 1810, created a Junta concerned with the sovereignty of the community,
based upon home rule (72). Even so, many of those that attended the Cabildo Abierto of September
18, 1810 to create the Junta were devotedly loyal to the crown (91).39 1810 marked the beginning
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of partisan divides in Chile between the loyalists and the revolutionaries. It was the voices of the
revolutionaries that would eventually win out, but not without conflict.
Revolutionary ideology, nationalism and an official movement away from Spain defined
the years between 1810-1814. By 1812, the government of Chile had gone beyond formal
proclamations of loyalty and semi-sovereignty to discussing the advantages of home rule, yet
independence was never publicly proclaimed in these years (108-109).40 Chilean Creole elites even
attempted to work with the restored monarchy until 1814 to address Creole grievances as Chileans
were unready to cut ties with the motherland. When their grievances could not be meaningfully
addressed, the conflict between loyalists and revolutionaries became deeply pronounced as the
royalists’ call for separation became heightened. The conflict between these factions became
evident in May, 1814 when royalists and revolutionaries came together to sign a peace agreement
called the Treaty of Lircay (46).41 The Treaty asserted that the Chilean government would
administer the region with a degree of autonomy but not independent of the Peruvian viceroy or
Ferdinand VII. The Treaty further articulated that Chile was an “integral part of the Spanish
monarchy” but that Chile would retain its trading relations (46).42 The Treaty put a temporary end
to the fighting between royalists and revolutionaries, but in reality, it was a temporary measure by
which the revolutionaries sought to appease the royalists.
After years of revolutionary squabble, the revolutionaries won out on battlefields in 1817
and on the grounds of patriotic enthusiasm in 1818. In 1818, the revolutionaries gathered to
proclaim their independence. In their calls for independence, they cite the “disorder of all abuses”
which the Spanish Crown expected them to live under as what naturally inspired Chile to
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“unanimously” decide to separate from Spain.43 Another disappointment to the revolutionaries,
not unlike American grievances several decades earlier, was Spain’s refusal to allow Chile to form
a National Congress to vote on pressing issues such as declaring independence. To the Chilean
revolutionaries, who believed in a government founded upon popular sovereignty, the Spanish
monarch’s actions and rulership over the country had no legitimacy.
Within the Proclamation of Independence, the values of popular sovereignty are
encapsulated. Besides calling for a National Congress, the revolutionaries asked for an
independent state, reflective of their interest, developed by the citizens themselves.44 The
revolutionaries then reference the people that they speak for as justification for their proclamation.
The revolutionaries reference the unanimity that backs them in proclaiming independence from
Spain, reaffirming the popular will of the people they represent. The ideas of representation
proclaimed by the revolutionaries in their Proclamation of Independence became core values for
the Chilean people that became installed in the 1833 Constitution.
Chilean Post-Independence: 1817-1831
Between 1817 and 1833, Chile had 16 presidents and a vacancy, as well as 4 Constitutions.
Moving towards a new system of governance, Chileans agreed that monarchy and other indirect
forms of election were unacceptable, akin to the tyranny of Ferdinand VII just before (143-147).45
Bernardo O’Higgins, a revolutionary leader and signatory of the Proclamation of Independence of
Chile (1818), was the first Supreme Dictator of Chile (the name was derived from Argentina).
O’Higgins chartered the first Constitution of 1818, which Collier describes as provisional (245).
The Constitution of 1822 was far more complex and was the first “full-scale” Constitution in
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Chilean history (245).46 It fully promoted the ideals of popular sovereignty, while maintaining the
powers of the Supreme Dictator. In January of 1823, however, Bernardo O’Higgins was forced to
abdicate his office and flee, never to return to Chile again (261).47 Following O’Higgins’
resignation, the Constitution of 1823 was passed and promoted to be the permanent Constitution
of Chile. Its regulations abridged into the public and private lives of all Chileans but maintained
their rights to vote. Article 29 of the 1823 Constitution stated, “The sovereignty of the Republic
resides fully and fundamentally in the whole body of citizens,” (264).48 The writer of the 1823
Constitution, Juan Egaña, believed in a republican form of government with checks and balances
between the branches of government. Article 276 of the 1823 Constitution proclaimed its
permanency, but it was broken down by the liberal regime by 1828 (281).49 In 1828, the “liberal”
Constitution of Chile was passed while the liberals had power. The 1828 Constitution struck an
apparent balance between centralism and federalism, for the first time in Chile (292). 50 In all,
Simon Collier argues that the widespread political turmoil and disorder of the period 1817-1831,
in part the result of many political changes and failures, created a strong current of political
disillusionment (323).51 By 1831 calls for constitutional reform were renewed.
The original impetus for constitutional reform came from the Cabildo of Santiago, a
provincial group of authorities. In February 1831, the Cabildo informed President Ovalle’s
administration that they believed reform was necessary. The administration immediately informed
the Congress of Plenipotentiaries which decreed that the next Congress would be charged with
carrying out the reforms (45).52 On October 1st, 1831, Joaquin Prieto, the new President, signed
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into law a mandate to reform the 1828 Constitution and the body which would do that work: The
Gran Convención.53 Those charged with reforming the Constitution sought to bring stability to
Chile, by whatever means necessary, without infringing on the liberties of the people. The first
session of the Convención met on 20 October 1831 to elect the president of the convention. The
next day the convention met to select the delegates for reforming the Constitution (51).54 There
were 36 delegates: 16 deputies and 20 enlightened citizens (45).55 Once the delegates were chosen,
the Convención immediately set to work to reform the Constitution of 1828, but eventually decided
to write an entirely new one.
Chilean Political Theory:
Fundamental Principles During the Revolution and Immediately After: 1808-1831
In my studies, it appears as though Chileans did not produce seminal works like The
Federalist, nor did they utilize political theory for intellectual purposes, with notable exceptions.
Simon Collier argues that political theory was engaged in for practical purposes between 1810 and
1833 to convince other elites of their practical ideas on government (129). The Chilean revolution
also failed to produce an “original” political theorist (131).56 Despite not having original theorists
or producing seminal works, Chileans ascribed to key principles: a social pact was one between
society and its rulers; rulers ensured the functions of a society; and a social contract (134-136).57
The social contract theory, one widely cited in revolutionary writings from all around the
Americas and Europe, and widely discussed in Chile was a key subscription by the Chilean
revolutionaries. The notion of a social contract was highly important to the revolutionaries; they
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believed that society gave men happiness (136).58 Connected with the doctrine of social contract
was popular sovereignty. During the revolution, revolutionary friar Camilo Henríquez wrote,
Sovereignty is a power superior to all the other powers in society. Considered at its root, the
term can only correspond to a power anterior to all others, a power which constituted all
others, which is to say the power that created the social pact or constitution; and nobody
doubts that this primitive and inalienable power, independent of all forms of government,
resides in the community (138).59
Another of Henríquez’s pieces, “Fundamental Notions of the Rights of Peoples”, written in 1811
affirmed the notion that “supreme authority finds its origins in the free consent of the people, which
we call a social pact,”.60
During the legislative session of December 11, 1824, a delegate reaffirmed the value of popular
sovereignty,
Sovereignty resides in the people. It is intransmissible. [The people] can never be rid of it.
We for our part are simply a few commissioners, entrusted with making laws… We do not
possess more than this power, which is a part of the delegated sovereignty (139).61
To most Chileans, representative government was thought to be the only valid mechanism
through which sovereignty could be delegated.62 Government, fundamentally, was to be governed
by the consent of the governed. For this reason, Chileans rejected indirect forms of election,
preferring direct election. Even so, universal suffrage was not a key element of their representative
government (147).63 Chilean governments, under each Constitution, passed various suffrage
requirements including literacy requirements, property requirements, and others, to limit the
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franchise, and thus the voice and will of the people. Although the franchise was limited, Chileans
believed that representation had to be fairly allocated, and that representatives had to be “prudent
organs” that could promote or represent the public good of the people (147).64
Beyond conceptions of representation, Chileans had beliefs regarding the importance of
Constitutions. Chileans held that Constitutions were of fundamental importance to society as they
embodied the guarantees and obligations of a social contract (150).65 To Chileans, a constitution
was a sacred document endowed with the means of efficiency (188).66 Within their Constitutions,
the rights to representation and various other individual rights were a man’s noblest possessions.
As noted previously, constitutions can be seen as mission statements and reflections of core values.
For Chileans, then, the constitution was seen as the objective of the people, a document
encapsulating their future hopes and dreams, and reflecting the values of the nation-state.
As Andrés Bello noted, drafting constitutions is the work of trial and error. Prior to 1833, the
Chilean Constitution’s previous writers couldn’t seem to get it right, even if their values and
conception of people were in the right place. Following decades of political and social turmoil, the
drafters of the 1833 Constitution proposed something new, although their political thinking on
matters of representation and Constitutions wasn’t too different.
Political Thought Between 1829-1833
President General Prieto, like other conservatives between 1829-1833, argued that the
Constitution of 1833 by and large was, “a means of putting an end to the revolutions and
disturbances which arose from the confusion in which the triumph of independence left us,”
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(332).67 By 1829, the people of Chile were deeply disillusioned with liberal leadership and focused
on order and power as a solution to its problems. The conservative victory in the 1829 Vice
Presidential election arguably gave the conservatives the backing they needed to install their ideas
in political institutions.
The Conservative idea was simple: establish a strong, central and businesslike government.68
As many have noted, the Constitution of 1833 essentially created a “constitutional dictatorship”
under the guise of stability.69 Collier put it a little more diplomatically: Chile managed to stop
disorder by creating a strong and impersonal authority by constitutional government (324). 70 In
the conservative camp, key figures like Mariano Egaña (the key drafter of Chile’s 1833
Constitution) and Diego Portales, dominated the discourse. Although Diego Portales did not
participate in the Gran Convención, and his role in establishing Constitutional ideas is debated, it
is true that Portales’ conservative ideas dominated the political scene at the time. Mariano Egaña
and his writings, however, played a significant role in the textual and ideological development of
the constitution. In particular, Egaña’s Voto Particular wielded considerable influence (344345).71
Mariano Egaña’s Voto Particular was written in May of 1832 and proposed to the Gran
Convención as a draft of the Constitution. While some of his more ideologically conservative ideas
were ultimately abandoned or voted down by the convention delegates, his opinions on the rights
to representation were adopted in some form or another. Chapter 4, Article 12 states, “the
government of Chile is representative. The national representation will be composed of the
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President of the Republic, of a Senate, and of a Chamber of Deputies,”. 72 Chapter 4, Article 13
states, “the method of choosing national representation pertains to the citizens, in the form and
with the quality prescribed by the Constitution,”.73 The ideas laid forth in Chapter 4, Articles 12
and 13 were fairly consistent with the ideas of most other Chilean intellectuals. His method of
election was more contentious: Chapter 13, Article 95 states, “The citizens will gather in electoral
assemblies for the election of national representation, and the other arrangements of the
Constitution or the law,”.74 However, as Collier notes, Chileans rejected indirect forms of election
such as electoral colleges (assemblies), instead preferring direct election (147).75 His proposal for
election was voted down during the convention. It was during the convention that Egaña also
changed his mind. On October 25, 1832, Mariano Egaña argued that everything functions from
the public, and that they should choose their destiny.76 In other reflections of representation
surrounding the Constitution, most would agree with Egaña’s proposal on October 25, 1832.
An author by the penname “R.B” writing on October 13, 1831 defended the values of popular
sovereignty and the necessity of representative democracy. R.B. argues that the origin of modern
representation, that of bicameralism and legislatures, is due to the division of labor among civilized
states. Further, the divided interests of a nation have led to different, divided needs of the people
to be represented.77 To, R.B., the only rational form of government had to be democratically
elected in the form of a legislature. R.B. believed this because every man was able to give his
opinion by which the legislator was to listen carefully and critically in order to make informed
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decisions.78 Any other body, such as a parliament, would be a function of the state, versus the
people. To R.B. and most Chileans, the people were to reign supreme in their government and their
constitution was to work to ensure that the people were heard.
Ideas Made Constitutional
In the end, the Constitution read in Chapter I, Article 1, “the government of Chile is popular
and representative,”.79 Whereas there is no preamble, aside from an explanation for the reforms
presented in the new constitution, the first thing stated, to be supreme in the land is that Chile’s
government would be by and for the people. Unlike the American Constitution, the Chilean
Constitution defined their form of government as both “popular and representative,”. While the
American government is both, it does not define itself as such in the Constitution. Chapter V,
Article 16 states, “The Chamber of Deputies shall be composed of members elected from the
departments by direct vote in the manner determined by the law of elections,”.80 The Chamber of
Deputies is elected and formed in similar form to the House of Representatives in the United States.
The Senate, however, is apportioned differently in Chile than in the United States. Chapter V,
Article 22 states, “The senate shall be composed of members elected by direct vote from the
provinces,”.81 The convention delegates determined to put forth a constitution in which
representation would be direct, not indirect, for both Senators and Deputies, whereas in the United
States only the House Representatives would be elected directly. The president, however was
chosen by elected electors. Chapter VI, Article 54 outlines the method of electing the president,
“The President of the Republic shall be elected by electors chosen by direct popular vote.”82
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Although both the United States and Chile utilize an electoral college or assembly for the President,
the people of Chile are given the choice to directly elect their electors, whereas the people of the
United States were subject to the will of their state representatives in choosing the president.
Although the Constitution is detailed and goes to great lengths to prescribe the means to regulate
society, it says nothing more of the people’s role in choosing how said society is to be regulated.
Although Chileans and Americans both heavily valued popular sovereignty, representative
republics, and similar means of electing their various representatives, and each Constitution shows
that, Chileans came to similar conclusions by different means. Both nations cite an oppressive
colonial governing system and said colonizer’s refusal to allow for national legislatures. However,
following independence, each nation had substantially different experiences. In Chile, social and
political disorder pushed Chileans towards reform consistent with their political values regarding
representation and greater social stability. To Chileans, popular sovereignty was essential, and the
Constitution of 1833 encapsulated that value better than any Constitution prior to it.
Conclusion:
Constitutions, fundamentally, are a reflection of a nation’s needs, hopes for the futures, and
solutions for issues of the past. In both Chile and the United States, Constitutions were seen as
sacred and necessary for stability, order and legitimacy in newly independent countries and for the
centuries to come. Both Chile and the United States suffered a series of setbacks in attaining
independence and trying to develop a Constitution worthy to their people and equally functional.
In 1833 and 1789, respectively, each nation developed a Constitution to achieve their unique
desired ends with similar respect to the people.
In both nations, the values of popular sovereignty and a direct right to representation were
developed, in varying ways. Both fundamentally agreed on the governing attaining the consent of

24

the governed, but how that was executed differed in their Constitutions. In Chile, both Senators
and Deputies were directly elected, and the franchised people even had a say in choosing their
executive electors. In the United States, the only directly elected representatives were those of the
House of Representatives. In terms of the executive, the state had the authority to choose its
electors, not the people. In Chile, the value of direct election was held at a higher rate, whereas the
American framers had to be mindful of states’ rights and requests for semi-autonomy.
While the Constitutions handled the issue of representation in semi-similar ways and
equally respected popular sovereignty, the unique needs and hopes of each country were
represented differently in their Constitutions based on each country’s historical experiences and
contemporary political considerations. For this reason, it is reductionist to argue that the Chilean
Constitution merely copied and pasted the American Constitution of 1789. Through a holistic
understanding of Chile and America’s independence history, their primary governing documents,
political thought at the time, and the resultant clauses pertaining to representation, it is clear that
each Constitution is a reflection of the nation, the people’s values, and representative of the
people’s rights in choosing government. Although each nation conducted a number of trials and
suffered a number of errors, the Framers of America’s 1789 Constitution and Chile’s 1833
Constitution were able to modify the application of values that were held throughout each nation’s
history and create lasting, supreme documents that ensured their people’s right to be represented.
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